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ROBERT H. LOWIE
Among the problems that exercised the minds of the earlier
evolutionists who dealt with human society, that of property was
one of the most important. Its influence in modern industrial
civilization was potent; hence the evolutionary schematist na-
turally assumed that in the earliest phases of culture it had
been nil. Lewis H. Morgan's views may be taken as represen-
tative. He distinguished three major periods,-Savagery, Bar-
barism, and Civilization. The beginnings of Barbarism were
defined by the invention of pottery, those of Civilization by the
use of a phonetic alphabet and literary records. The two former
periods were subdivided each into a Lower, Mliddle, and Upper
Status. It was not until the liddle Status of Barbarism-ex-
emplified by the village life of our Southwestern Indians, of the
aboriginal lexicans and the Peruvians-that Morgan assumed
property to have played an important part. Among "savages,"
he held, property was inconsiderable.
"Their ideas concerning its value, its desirability and its in-
heritance were feeble. Rude weapons, fabrics, utensils, apparel,
implements of flint, stone and bone, and personal ornaments
represent the chief items of property in savage life. A passion
for its possession had scarcely been formed in their minds,
because the thing itself scarcely existed." 1
In short, Morgan does not deny that pre-ceramic savages had
chattels, but he minimizes the importance of the property held,
and of the correlated acquisitive urge. His successors have
generally followed his leadership and assumed as a matter of
course that on primitive levels property rights were weakly de-
veloped, there being a far-reaching communistic trend; and,
specifically, that land was not appropriated by individuals or
even families in the hunting stage.
3IMoGAN.T, ANCIENT SociETY (1877) pt. IV, c. 1.
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These propositions are no longer tenable. In part they rest
on ignorance of the ethnographic data, often on a failure to
discriminate between moral and legal prescriptions. To illus-
trate the latter point, it is unquestionably customary to share
the necessaries of life in a manner that sometimes amounts to
practical communism; yet, as a rule, in strict aboriginal law
the line is clearly drawn between what is one's actual due and
what is merely an ethical claim. There are, indeed, extreme
instances. In northeastern Siberia a boat lying idle may be
put to effective use without the "owner's" consent, nor is the
borrower liable for damages in case of injury. Yet among these
same populations, other forms of property are jealously guarded
from encroachment. As for land, Seligmann has shown that
the Vedda of Ceylon not only own tracts individually but prac-
tice a form of conveyance; and the prominence of hunting-
territories among our Northeastern Algonkians of New Eng-
land and Eastern Canada has been extensively described by
Professor Speck.2
This position is fully borne out by data on two genuinely
"esavage" groups, in Morgan's sense-the Yamana (Yaghan),
the most southerly of South American tribes, and the Semang,
a Negrito people of the Malay Peninsula.
The Yamana, in particular, exemplify the mingling of ethical
and legal principles that has sometimes in the past misled socio-
logical interpretation. Here there does not happen to be indi-
vidual or family ownership of an economically valuable area,
which is held to belong to the entire territorial group. Certain
raw materials, such as iroi pyrites for fire-making and a species
of tree whose bark was suitable for the native types of canoe,
were restricted to definite localities; and in these instances,
utilization was permitted to territorial groups other than those
within whose normal range these natural resources happened
to lie. Nevertheless, personal property rights were recognized
and, as usual, they rested on individual manufacture and effec-
tive use. Baskets must be bought from women, harpoons from
men; as elsewhere in North and South America, even the chil-
dren's claims to ownership are respected. While most of these
chattels were burnt with the corpse, a dog was invariably in-
herited by the eldest son or some other kinsman or acquaintance.
Food is treated in the quasi-communistic fashion often reported
for primitive tribes. In a particular case a successful seal-
hunter immediately divided his kill into seven portions, of which
he retained two, dividing the remainder among the five tribes-
men present. Similarly, it is considered self-evident that the
discoverer of a stranded whale should not play the part of a
2 LoWiE, PRIMITIVE SociEry (1920) c. 9.
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miser but should forthwith spread the glad tidings. Yet it is
interesting to note that he had a prior claim to the booty and
might select favored pieces or direct the distribution. However,
no one was privileged simply to appropriate his neighbor's food,
and any one who abused the privilege of hospitality soon fell in
public estimation. There was also a pronounced tendency to
make presents, whether of food, necklaces, slings, spears, or
other implements; and acceptance involved the obligation of mak-
ing a suitable return gift. The very fact of this institution
constitutes proof of individual property rights.-
For the Semang the same general principle holds. Clothing
and tools are personal property and can be borrowed only with
the owner's consent. Husband and wife pool their possessions
without relinquishing their separate claims, and neither spouse
inherits from the other. The hut belongs to its normal builder,
i. e., the woman, so that a divorced husband is obliged to leave
it. Food is, indeed, shared with fellow-tribesmen, at least so
far as they are related. However, two species of trees, the
durian fruit-tree and the ipoh, which furnishes arrow-poison,
are owned individually. To every adult male belong one or more
ipohs and several scattered durian trees. No one would venture
to trespass on these prerogatives by cutting into an ipoh or
climbing a durian trunk.4
The dogma of general primitive communism is, however, at
once eliminated by the wide prevalence of individually owned
forms of incorporeal property. Their very existence-sometimes
on very rude levels, indeed, and alongside of virtual communism
in other directions, is a noteworthy phenomenon; and the re-
strictions on absolute ownership rights imposed by the varying
mores of different peoples are no less interesting.
The Eskimo may be profitably studied from this point of viev.
Like the Arctic Siberians', their hunting customs, viewed in
isolation, might go far to support the notion that personal
ownership is lacking. Yet the magical formulae that secure
the Central Eskimo's luck in the chase are not shared com-
munally. One man who was very successful in catching salmon
stated that his grandmother had taught him what to sing when
fishing. This song for salmon is also effective for seal; but for
ground-seal he must sing another one, and still others for musk-
oxen and for caribou. He had not taught these songs to his
children, but intended to do so before he died. Nor were in-
cantations confined to hunting: anciently people could use them
3 Koppers, Die Farmen des Eigentums dcr Yamnana auf Fcucrland (192G)
3 NEUE 0RNuNG 1-22.
4 SCHEBESTA, BEI DEN URWALDzWERGEV VON MALAYA (1927) 78 ct scq., 225.
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to shorten their journeys, but while reciting a spell of this
category they were not allowed to look back.
Fuller data are available for the corresponding phenomena
among the Greenland Eskimo. Spells are emphatically private
property (en privat og hemmelig eiendom, andre ikke maa
bruge). They are potent not because of any spiritual agency
but through the virtue of the words themselves, even though
these are sometimes unintelligible. Some of the spells corres-
pond to household remedies that eliminate the need for calling
upon a shaman to treat a patient. The largest number, how-
ever, are designed to secure good luck in the chase. To quote
Holm:
"The charms are of great antiquity, and are as a general rule
handed down from one generation to the other by sale. They
are most effective the first time they are used and little by little
they lose their power; hence they must not be used except in
times of danger, or when they are transferred to another. When
the transference takes place, none but the buyer and seller may
be present, and in order that they may have effect, they must
be paid immediately, and dearly paid too, if there is to be any
power in them; but then they do the possessor much benefit.
The payment may consist, e. g., of dart points, lance points, or
other costly iron work. As they are much reluctant to use the
charms without absolute necessity, it is extremely difficult to
get to hear them."
One of Holm's informants recited for him a charm he had
effectively used when on the point of death. The explorer says:
"I paid for hearing it, otherwise it would have lost its power." 0
The inconsistency involved in the Eskimo position has already
been alluded to: a communistic trend as to economic necessaries
is coupled with strict individualism as to the magical means of
securing food. Let us also note the limitations imposed. Effec-
tiveness, for one thing, is contingent on purchase: in other
words, the owner is not absolute owner in a metaphysical sense,
for he cannot give away his spell as a gift without destroying
its efficacy-a rather transparent rationalization. How far this
view applies to the Central Eskimo instances is doubtful; pos-
sibly there the children have a pre-emptive claim to instruction
in their elders' sacred knowledge.
Among the Arctic Northeast Siberians similar conceptions
hold sway. The incantations sung by the Koryak are derived ul-
timately from the Creator and have a variety of virtues,-cura-
tive, game-luring, and what not. They are usually in the custody
5 Boas, The Eskimo of Baffin Land and Hudson Bay (1907) 15 BULL.
ADIER. Mus. NAT. HIST. 153, 506.
61 THALBrrZER, THE AbMMASSALIK ESKIMTO (1914) 87 et seq., 305; 2 ibid.
(1923) 248-278; THALBITZ ER, ESKIMOERNES KULTISKE GUDDoMIE (1926) 34.
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of elderly women, who do not lightly divulge their sacred knowl-
edge lest its efficacy be destroyed. A statement of Jochelson's
concerning the conveyance of ownership is most illuminating:
"When a woman sells an incantation, she must promise that
she gives it up entirely, and that the buyer will become the only
possessor of its mysterious power."
In other words, acquisition of full proprietary rights involves
more even than the esoteric formula; it requires also the transfer
of a rough equivalent of "good-will." 7
This naturally leads to a vindication of the incorporeal char-
acter of certain forms of property that at first blush do not
appear to merit that designation. For example, a superficial
view of the ceremonial complexes commonly transferred among
the Plains Indians would emphasize the material contents con-
veyed. To make the matter concrete, the Blackfoot (M\ontana,
Alberta) had a series of so-called military societies, each of which
was entered jointly by a group of approximate age-mates who
purchased membership outright from an older group. Thus,
the Hidatsa Dog organization of any period comprised individ-
uals all of whom had collectively bought such badges as eagle-
bone whistles, owl-feather headdresses, and dewclaw rattles from
the company preceding them as owners of the ceremonial com-
plex labeled "Dog." In so far as all these and other regalia
were tangible objects, the term "incorporeal property" might be
challenged in this connection. However, closer scrutiny reveals
the fact that a transfer implied much more than a mere pur-
chase of the ordinary character. First of all, the buyers ob-
tained the right to perform a specific dance, and some of their
officers gained the prerogative of appropriating any food sus-
pended from the meat-racks in the camp. But even the badges
themselves were not prized in themselves but in their proper
setting: a dewclaw rattle, for example, could have been imitated
by the Kit-fox or Lumpwood society, but unless duly bought in
the approved fashion from the rightful owners it was nothing
but a travesty of the real article.,
This point of view appears still more clearly in the case of
the sacrosanct complexes known as sacred bundles. The Beaver
bundle of the Blackfoot comprises an amazing variety of dis-
parate objects, such as skins of beavers, muskrats, and wildcats;
skins of various birds; and so forth. Naturally, it would not be
difficult to duplicate these elements, but it is not in them that
7Jochelson, Material Culture and Social Organization of the KoryjaT
(1908) 10 AnEu. AmL. Mlus. NAT. HisT. 59.8 Lowie, Societies of the Hidatsa and Mandan Indians (1913) 11 A=mROP.
PAPERS, A1i%. Mlus. NAT. HIST. 225 et seq.
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the mystic potency of the Beaver bundle inheres; they are noth-
ing but outward symbols of what is essential, to wit, the privi-
lege to sing certain sacred songs and to perform the ritual as-
sociated with the objects.
"At the formal transfer, the ritual is demonstrated as far
as possible, four days and nights being required to complete it.
In the normal order of events the ex-owner continues to instruct
the purchaser for an indefinite period." 1
Unless a man had received this instruction he would not own
anything genuinely valuable. In other words, he buys a series
of prerogatives including one or more songs," the right to certain
specific modes of behavior, knowledge of the origin myth con-
nected with the bundle, and a tangible object or set of objects
-within a wrapping, to be guarded and opened according to cer-
tain rules.
Why unsanctioned mimicry of the material parts of the bundle
would be futile, becomes at once obvious from an exposition of
aboriginal theory. The Blackfoot believe that every bundle
emanates from a direct revelation by a supernatural power.
"The being appearing in the dream offers or consents upon
request to give power for some specific purpose. This is done
with more or less ceremony; usually the face and hands of the
recipient are painted, songs sung, directions given for invoking
the power and certain obligations, or taboos, laid upon the re-
cipient. The being conferring power is not content with saying
that it shall be, but formally transfers it to the recipient with
appropriate ceremonies. This is regarded as a compact between
the recipient and the being then manifest, and each is expected
to fulfill faithfully his own obligations."
Whenever the ritual is performed, it is supposed to be a faith-
ful replica of the initial transfer. One of the significant
phenomena in this whole affair is the original visionary's right
to transfer the contract to another, who thus acquires all his
predecessor's rights. Only by this quasi-apostolic succession
can the rapport with the supernatural world be maintained;
hence an invasion of copyright would not help insure the bless-
ings-longevity, health, and happiness-linked with authorized
ownership. On the other hand, the genuine proprietor cannot
lose the benefits connected with a bundle: "the bundle may be
lost or destroyed without seriously damaging the owner, since
he owns the ritual which is immaterial." Indeed, certain ad-
vantages cling to a former owner even after he has divested
himself of his formal privileges. He may be called upon to
9 Wissler, Ceremonial Bundles of the Blackfoot Indians (1912) 8 AN-
THROP. PAPERS, ADR. MUS. NAT. HIsT. 100, 107, 168 et seq., 272 ot seq.
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officiate in a ceremony because of his recognized familiarity
with it, or may administer a deceased owner's bundle until a
proper transfer is consummated, and in either case would pocket
a fee.
As regards the transmission of sacred bundles, basic differ-
ences divide the Plains tribes. With the Omaha and Pawnee,
inheritance by the next of kin takes the place of the Blackfoot
notion of transfer. While the Blackfoot do not exclude a son from
accession to his father's ceremonial privileges, he must acquire
them like any stranger, i.e., by the same formal acts of convey-
ance, and these more frequently obtain between unrelated tribes-
men, though symbolically the purchaser is regarded as the "son"
of the seller. An interesting fusion of the two contradictory
principles encountered in the area occurs among the Hidatsa.
They, unlike the Blackfoot, had sons and daughters regularly
acquire a bundle from their own father, but they must invariably
pay him for it, one of the brothers afterwards becoming its
custodian. In other words, children inherit the right of jointly
buying proprietary rights from their own father. The latter
retains the privilege of joining in the ritual activities, of singing
the songs and offering prayers during a performance. Bound
up with each bundle are a host of specific prerogatives, such as
using a particular method of painting some object in the bundle.
These are purchased on the same occasion as the bundle, but
must be paid for separately. "A privilege of this sort may be
sold four times by the owner, whereupon he loses all his title
to it, as among the Crow in corresponding cases." Here, as
among the Blackfoot, the spiritual transfer was essential. In
fact, the buyer usually did not get the identical objective consti-
tuents of his father's bundle but sought to duplicate them by
requisitioning the services of a father's clansman; only if the
latter failed in his quest did the father supply what was neces-
sary.
"It was the immaterial proprietary rights to a bundle and its
ritual that were established by the transfer ceremony, which
transformed a potential into an actual prerogative." 10
The data for the Northern Plains tribes invite nice discussions
of the basic character of "ownership" in this connection. On the
one hand, it would appear v priori that where property rights
are directly conferred by divine or supernatural agency, they
must be ipso facto indefeasible. That is, of course, true with
reference to hunmo instrumentalities. Full kmowledge of the
rituals is monopolized by the owner, and any one else speaking
2o Lowie, Sun Dance of thw Shoslwni, Ute, and Hidatc, (1919) 16 An-
THROP. PAPERS, ABLER. Mus. NAT. HIsT. 415 et seq.
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about them from observation or hearsay is not only limited in
his information and almost bound to fall into error, but stands
revealed as a poacher encroaching on an alien preserve. How-
ever, the supernatural origin of the power held implied its re-
vocability by the source of the blessing. Specifically, any in-
fraction of the rules linked with the bundle was fraught with
danger. For example, a Beaver bundle imposed many and oner-
ous restrictions on its Blackfoot possessor. If he comes to the
bank of a stream he must not turn back but must cross since
he is not supposed to show fear of water in any form. Cooking
must never be done outside his tipi, yet its sides may not be
lifted, irrespective of the temperature. He must never blow
the fire; in case of necessity he is allowed to blow through a
pipestem. He cannot take back property borrowed from him.
He may not eat.of the beaver nor of the birds in the sacred pack.
"The narrator," writes Wissler, "was once up in the mountains
and was greatly famished. Finally he ventured to eat a grouse.
This made him deathly ill." In short, the owner of sacred prop-
erty is in many respects not its master but its slave.
Another limitation of full ownership has already been men-
tioned: the owner frequently is not empowered to give his sacred
privileges away, he can only sell them, even though it be to his
own son or daughter. Thus, the designs painted on members in
the initiation ceremony of the Crow Indian Tobacco society were
not free for all; each method of decoration represented a pre-
rogative acquired in a specific vision, and was transferable in
the usual manner of ceremonial rights.
"Greybull... had once acquired the painting privilege from
his own mother, paying her an ermine shirt, a horse, quilts, and
money. He sold the right to Plenty-coups for four horses." 1
Perhaps still more significant is the fact that a bundle owner
may be forced to part with his property. In some cases the
obligation is apparently moral rather than legal. Thus, Strikes-
at-night, a Crow woman impoverished by her husband's blind-
ness, coveted a Horse Dance bundle supposed to bring good luck.
Direct offers of purchase were declined by the owners. To quote
my informant,
"One owner wanted a tent and needed hides tanned. Since
I was a good tanner, I went to his wife and offered to tan all the
requisite hides without demanding pay outright. I got two hides
the first time; they were large. I fixed them nicely, returned
them, and said I would fix up the whole lodge for them."
11 Lowie, The Tobacco Society of the Crow Indians (1919) 21 ANTHROP.
PAPEnRS, AmER. Mus. NAT. HIsT. 149.
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In this way Strikes-at-night prepared all the hides. Then the
woman favored asked what pay the tanner wanted. "No, I want
to take your medicine." The beneficiary said, "If you had told
me before, I should never have let you finish the hides. Now I
can hardly refuse you." Accordingly, she and her husband
adopted my informant, conveying the ownership to her. "The
other people were telling me I was very cunning because of the
way I got the medicine." 12
In the instance just cited the impression conveyed to me was
that the compulsion, however strong in a moral sense, was not
complete. That is to say, my informant's adopter might have
been charged with ungraciousness had she refused to accede to
the tanner's demands, but could not have been coerced into ac-
quiescence. But among the Blackfoot the situation was different.
A man in dire need might make a vow that if he came out of
his difficulty safely he would buy a particular type of bundle.
"Such appeals are usually made to the sun. The vow usually
names a particular bundle and is registered before witnesses.
In such cases, the owner has no option, to sell being impera-
tive.""
What results, then, from a survey of ceremonial rights in the
Plains is that some of them are unequivocally personal. That is
to say, they are not shared even by the next of kin nor do they
automatically accrue to the holder's heirs. In this respect, a
difference obtains between them and otherwise comparable privi-
leges among the Nootka of Vancouver Island. Here each family
has its stock of songs,
"no outsider being permitted to make use of them, unless
deputed to do so by the owner . . . . Any woman may be hired
to sing her.., song at a menstrual potlatch, being paid for her
services by the giver of the ceremony."
While some privileges are individual in the sense that they
might be withheld from the normal heir under unusual circum-
stances, the most characteristic ones could not be diverted from
the eldest-born son in this region of aboriginal primogeniture,
so that the lineage of eldest-born descendants virtually consti-
tute a joint-company as regards the relevant rights."4 Notwith-
standing, however, the individual nature of ceremonial owner-
ship in the Plains, the religious and ethical notions bound up
" Lowie, Minor Ceremonics of the Crow Izdiana (1924) 21 ANTHEoM.
PAPERS, AMER. Mus. NAT HIST. 331.
"-Wissler, op. cit. supra note 9, at 155, 174.
'4 Sapir, Personal Communicatioz, also, A Girl's Pubcrty Ccrcmony
among the Nootkl Indianz (1913) Tiu.s. ROYAL Soc. CAN,%DA 67-80.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
with it materially limit full property rights, sometimes even in
a definitely legal sense.
Equally instructive are the data from the Trobriand Islands
off the east coast of New Guinea.15 In his eagerness to empha-
size the distinctive types of ownership in different parts of the
world, Dr. Malinowski goes so far as to regard it as "a grave
error to use the word ownership with the very definite connota-
tion given to it in our own society." Because the meaning we
attach to it is linked with highly developed economic and legal
conditions he infers that "therefore the term 'own' as we use it
is meaningless, when applied to a native society." Worse than
that, it "smuggles a number of preconceived ideas into our de-
scription." This, however, is manifestly to exaggerate a legiti-
mate point. To be forearmed against the perils of loosely apply-
ing our terminology, to be keenly sensible of the uniqueness of
any particular society and its institutions, is an excellent thing.
But we cannot coin a special word for every shade of possessory
right as locally defined in the four quarters of the globe. It is
far more important to define all such rights conceptually than
to devise an infinite series of labels for them, a demand logically
implied in Dr. Malinowski's contention, though his common sense
prevents him from conforming to it.
His discussion of the sociology of canoe ownership, which
immediately follows the propositions cited, furnishes excellent
illustrations both of his point and our qualification of it. Dr.
Malinowski demonstrates conclusively that the toli-wag or
"canoe-owner," to use the nearest English equivalent, is not
an absolute owner. While he has the right to choose or eliminate
his companions on an expedition, his maternal kinsmen "have,
according to all native ideas of right and law, a strong claim on
the canoe." Further, even unrelated patricians of the com-
munity could not easily be excluded in the absence of special
cause; and still others would have a moral "de facto right to
sail" because of their skill as mariners. Again, it is the toli-
waga that assembles the council and broaches the question as
to the date of sailing. However, this right of initiative, on closer
scrutiny, turns out to be purely nominal, since "both in con-
struction and sailing, the date of enterprise is determined by
outward causes, such as reciprocity to overseas tribes, seasons,
customs, etc." This same sort'of relative property right is dis-
tinctive of the "Kula," an extraordinary system of exchange by
which arm-shells and necklaces ceremonially prized are ex-
changed, each gift being repaid by an equivalent counter-gift.
Here, Dr. Malinowski points out that the recipient never retains
1 5 ALwNowsKI, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFic (1922) 81-104,
116-120.
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his acquisition for any length of time,-never for more than a
year or two, and even this moderate period "exposes him to the
reproach of being niggardly." In other words, public sentiment
demands that valuables of this type be kept in circulation.
Evidently our authority is warranted in saying that this sort
of "ownership," esteemed because of the renown coupled with
even fleeting possession, is sui generis.
Notwithstanding this admission, however, there is evidence
that ownership quite as complete as any found in any community
coexists with those more limited forms that have so deeply im-
pressed their reporter. Let us return to the toli-waga. However
he may be restricted in the practical utilization of a boat, the
honorific title is indefeasibly his. Even when his closest mater-
nal kinsmen collectively apply it to themselves, "this would be
an abuse of the term." Further, "the mere privilege of using
exclusively this title is very highly valued by the natives ;" and
though the right of summoning the council and inaugurating a
voyage is admittedly nominal, "the formal privilege is strictly
confined to the toli-waga, and highly valued," quite apart evi-
dently from the appreciable economic perquisites of the office.
To turn to other phases of culture. In the Trobriands,
myths are not owned quite so exclusively as in certain other
areas, yet particular ones are associated with lineages who "are
supposed to possess the most intimate knowledge of the mythical
events, and to be an authority in interpreting them." Dances
are more definitely individual property, the original inventor
having the right to perform it in his village. "If another vil-
lage takes a fancy to this song and dance, it has to purchase the
:ight to perform it." Similarly, magical power-the knowledge
of formulae intrinsically potent to achieve desired ends--is rated
as a form of property. A very interesting analogy (though with
a difference) to certain Plains Indian conditions may be noted.
Sometimes matrilineal blood-relatives, who would be the natural
heirs under aboriginal law, desire to secure certain goods in
their elder's lifetime. In such cases substantial payments must
be made by the nephew or the younger brother, e.g., the magic
may be taught bit by bit in return for payment in instalments.
"After the final payment, the title of ownership is definitely
handed over to the younger man." "I The difference from the
Hidatsa bundle concept lies in the fact that apparently material
as well as incorporeal goods may be thus acquired by a Tro-
briander; and, further, an Hidatsa could not inherit the bundle
except by making the customary payment.
Disabilities on sex lines introduce us to another category of
incorporeal privileges. In the Banks Islands of Melanesia women
16 Ibid. 185 et seq., 291, 317, 329.
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never drink or prepare kava, and only in quite recent times have
they been allowed to watch its preparation. "I never saw my
informant more heartily amused," writes Rivers, "than when
I told him that I had seen kava being made by a woman in
Samoa." 17 This evidently must be taken in conjunction with
the widespread Melanesian and Australian custom of eliminating
women from ceremonial life, for on the Banks Islands the use
of kava was formerly restricted to those of high rank in the
men's fraternity. The sexual division of labor, involving as it
does an allotment of onerous tasks, seems to have little in com-
mon with the notion of property rights as commonly understood.
But it may also imply greater or lesser kudos, and frequently
very practical prerogatives. The Formosan women raise millet
and sweet potatoes, and it is they, not their husbands and
brothers, who superintend the granaries, dealing out daily sup-
plies to the female representatives of the several households."
On the other hand, in many African and Siberian tribes man's
concern with the care of cattle disqualifies women from owner-
ship, and cases are known in which remote kinsmen take prece-
dence of- daughters in the inheritance of livestock. In short,
sex often includes the right to potential ownership of goods,
corporeal or incorporeal.
This is naturally only a special form of group ownership.
Wherever succession to dignity is regulated by some such prin-
ciple as primogeniture, the entire group of incumbents, actual
and potential, may be conceived as a corporation, the entire mem-
bership sharing the same privileges, even though possession and
usufruct be limited to one individual at a time. It is this sense
of a group interest that of course tends to nullify testamentary
dispositions purporting to override established precedent.
A quaint coupling of prerogative with disability is reported
from a people of the Upper Nile region. Though a Lango woman
is never allowed to hold any but personal belongings, she may
veto her husband's proposal to give away a single head of stock,
provided it was obtained as a part of her daughter's bride-price.
The purpose of the custom is to safeguard the matrimonial pros-
pects of a woman's son, for here, as elsewhere in Africa, the
payment for a daughter is supposed to provide her brother with
a wife. To put it differently, a woman who has given birth to
a girl and married her off acquires thereby a limited control
over the compensation offered.& 9
The Lango furnish us with another instructive sample of
incorporeal property in disguise. Hunting-territories are owned
271 RIVERS, THE HISTORY OF MELANESIAN SOCIETY (1915) 82.
28 ]cGOVERN, AMONG THE HEAD-HUNTERS OF FORMOSA (1922) 124 et seq.
19 DRIBERG, THE LANGO, A NILOTIC TRIBE OF UGANDA (1923) 172.
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individually, and without the owner's consent encroachment by
other hunters would be illegal. However, there are responsibili-
ties accompanying prerogative. The tract must be surrounded
by a fire-break to ward off conflagrations spreading to or from
the plots of fellow-tribesmen. What, it may be asked, is there
incorporeal about land? The point is that no man really owns
"his" land. Anyone desiring to build on it or to reserve a plot
thereon for tillage cannot be denied, even though formal per-
mission must first be sought. In other words, "the uon anra
owns the hunting rights over the land rather than the land
itself." However, he is not liable for damage to the newcomer's
house or crops.20 This instance recalls comparable data from
New Zealand, where the same territory was differently ex-
ploited by different households. One family would have a mon-
opoly of the claim to the shellfish or berries found, another re-
served the right to dig fern-roots or to hunt rats.-1
Enough has been said to demonstrate the reality of incorporeal
ownership on the level of illiterate peoples. How vital a part
it plays in their lives is at once apparent when we recall the
manifold ramifications of the subject inevitable even in this
brief exposition. Starting from a juridical concept, we have
had to touch the entire scope of cultural phenomena,-not only
the proximate fields of social structure and government but the
more remote departments of economics, industry, arts, and re-
ligion.
0 IbUi. 112, 171.
21 LOWIE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 229.
